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In this appendix we explore the robustness of our results under the alternative scheme of linear
tariff contracts. In the first three sections, we derive the profit of the upstream firm U under an
auction and negotiation(s), and we determine its optimal choice among these selling mechanisms.
In section 4 we compare the profit of the upstream firm using a linear tariff with its profit under
two-part tariffs and argue that, in our setup, the upstream supplier would always choose selling
mechanisms based on two-part tariffs.
The assumptions about firms, demands and timing are the same as in the analysis in the paper,
only the contractual structure is different. Before proceeding, it is worth to mention that the cases
of an auction and an exclusive negotiation deliver closed-form solutions. Unfortunately, under non-
exclusive negotiations the calculations become overly cumbersome, which prevents us to obtain
intelligible analytical results. To cope with this issue, we perform simulations to determine the
optimal choices of the upstream firm.
1 Auction
As in the paper, we assume that the winning bid is the one that maximizes the upstream firm’s
profit upon execution of the contractual terms. This clarified, if U auctions off the terms of an
exclusive linear tariff contract, Dh wins the auction with a bid that gives U a profit
Π˜am =
ul
8
. (1)
The proof is as follows. If U were entitled to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer for a linear contract
to Dl, the offer would be wl = ul2 , which is the input price that maximizes U ’s profit given the
contractual form. U ′s profit level at that input price would be ul8 . This is, by construction,
1
the maximum bid firm Dl can submit. Clearly Dh can outbid Dl by submitting a wh such that
Dh(p
∗
h(wh)) × wh > ul8 . Intuitively, the revenue to firm U from the winning bid (demand at the
optimal price of firm Dh, as induced by wh, multiplied by the input price itself) is larger than that
it would obtain should Dl win the auction.1 It is straightforward that Dl cannot submit a higher o
lower bid, because by construction ul4 maximizes U ’s profit conditional on Dl winning the auction.
Similarly, Dh cannot lower the bid, because it would lose the auction, and raising it would lower
its profit, without affecting the outcome of the auction. As a consequence, the equilibrium bids are
w˜al =
ul
2 , w˜
a
h =
1
2
(
uh −√uh
√
uh − ul
)
+ η. At the winning bid, U ’s profit is (1).2
It is worth mentioning that the message conveyed by Remark 1 in the paper applies here as
well: the value of the auction for U is larger the more homogeneous the goods are. This is easily
seen from (1): for given uh, the larger ul is, the larger the profit from the auction. This is also seen
from the winning bid: The closer ul is to uh the closer the winning bis is to
uh
2 , which is the input
price that firm U would impose to firm Dh if it were entitled to make take-it-or-leave-it offers.
2 Negotiation(s)
Let wi be the wholesale price negotiated by U and Di, i = h, l. In the following we present only
the negotiation stage of the game, the downstream prices setting stages being the same as those
presented in Bacchiega et al. (2018).
2.1 Exclusivity
If the upstream supplier opts for an exclusive contract, at the negotiation stage the generalized
Nash product is:
NP ei (wi) = Πˆ
e(wi)
µpˆiei (wi)
1−µ. (2)
with Πˆe(wi) =
(ui−wi)wi
2ui
and pˆii(wi) =
(ui−wi)2
4ui
being the profits of U and Di respectively, evaluated
at the optimal price of firm i. The maximization of (2) with respect to wi yields the equilibrium
per-unit input price: w˜ei =
ui
2 µ. Therefore, the equilibrium downstream price is p˜
e
i =
ui
4 (2 +µ) and
the equilibrium demand is D˜ei =
(2−µ)
4 . The equilibrium profits of the upstream and downstream
firms are, respectively:
Π˜ei =
ui
8
(2− µ)µ and p˜iei =
ui
16
(µ− 2)2 (3)
1Easy computations return the optimal bid wh =
1
2
(
uh −√uh√uh − ul
)
+ η, with η > 0 and arbitrarily small.
2It is easy to show that, omitting η, at the equilibrium bids, the price of the good is p˜ah =
1
4
(
3uh −√uh√uh − ul
)
,
the demand for the good is 1
4
and firm Dh’s profit is p˜iah = 116
(√
uh − ul +√uh
)2
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It is immediate to ascertain that the the profit to firm U is larger when the exclusive contract is
signed with firm Dh, which entails that if U goes for an exclusive contract, it offers it to that firm.
2.2 Non-exclusivity
If U enters simultaneous and separate negotiations with the downstream firms, the profits functions
at the negotiation stage are given by:
pˆih(wh, wl) =
[
2u2h + uh(wl − 2(ul + wh)) + ulwh
]2
(uh − ul)(4uh − ul)2 ,
pˆil(wl, wh) =
uh [uh(ul − 2wl) + ul(wh + wl − ul)]2
ul(uh − ul)(4uh − ul)2 ,
Πˆ(wh, wl) =
ul(w
2
h(ul − 2uh) + 2uhwh(uh − ul)) + uhulwl(uh − ul + 2wh) + uhw2l (ul − 2uh)
ul(uh − ul)(4uh − ul) ,
and the generalized Nash products are as follows.3
NPh(wh, w
n
l ) =
[
Πˆ(wh, w
n
l )−
ul
8
(2− µ)µ
]µ
pˆih(wh, w
n
l )
1−µ, (4)
NPl(w
n
h , wl) =
[
Πˆ(wnh , wl)−
uh
8
(2− µ)µ
]µ
pˆil(wl, w
n
h)
1−µ. (5)
The equilibrium negotiated input prices are obtained by simultaneously maximizing the generalized
Nash products, but although they can be obtained analytically, their cumbersomeness prevents us
to draw any insight from them. One immediate consequence is that the equilibrium profits are
non-tractable too. To bypass this problem and compare the profits of firm U under exclusive
and non-exclusive negotiations we revert to numerical simulations; this way, we can determine the
optimal choice between them. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium profit of U if it enters an exclusive
negotiation (Π˜em) and non-exclusive negotiations (Π˜
n), for µ = (0.1, 0.5, 0.9), uh = 1, and ul ∈ (0, 1).
The clear message drawn from Figure 1 is that, conversely to the two-part tariff case, an
exclusive negotiation on the per-unit price is dominated by non-exclusive negotiations (Π˜n > Π˜em),
therefore it cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
3The Nash products are defined under the assumption of contingent contracts.
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Figure 1: U profits under exclusive negotiation and non-exclusive negotiations
3 Auction vs. negotiations
We are now in a position to compare the auction and non-exclusive negotiations as selling mecha-
nisms from the standpoint of firm U . Figure 2 reports the equilibrium profit of U in the case of an
auction (Π˜am), and of non-exclusive negotiations (Π˜
n), for µ = (0.1, 0.5, 0.9), uh = 1, and ul ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 2: U profit under negotiation and auction
This figure shows that the bargaining power (µ) and the degree of product differentiation ( 1ul ) are
still the main factors determining the upstream supplier’s decision about which selling mechanism
to implement.4 As under two-part tariffs, the auction is the optimal choice when bargaining power
is low and the products are homogeneous enough. The intuition is the same of that provided in
the case of two-part tariffs.
4 Linear tariff vs. two-part tariff
In the following we compare the profit of U under linear and two-part tariffs and suggest that
profitwise, the latter dominate the former. We build our argument on two observations.
4As we perform the simulations for uh = 1, the differentiation degree is given by
1
ul
.
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(i) First, the profit reaped by U with an auction with a linear tariff, Π˜am = ul8 (see 1), is always
lower than that under from an auction with a two-part tariff Πam =
ul
4 (see Lemma 2). This
implies that, whenever the upstream supplier finds it optimal to set-up an auction, it prefers
to run it with two-part tariffs.
(ii) The comparison of non-exclusive negotiations under linear and non-linear contacts has to be
performed through numerical simulations. However, before proceeding, it should be noticed
that Lemma 1 in the paper points out that non-exclusive negotiations are an optimal choice,
with non-linear contracts, only as long as µ < 34 , and for µ exceeding that threshold, an
exclusive negotiation with Dh is U ’s optimal choice. Keeping this in mind, the first two
panels of Figure 1 below (cases µ = .1 and µ = .5) report U ’s profit under non exclusive
negotiations with two-part tariffs (green curves) and with linear tariffs (blue curves). The
third panel (µ = .9) compares the profits from an exclusive negotiation over two-part tariffs
with Dh (yellow line), with the profit from non-exclusive negotiations over linear tariffs (blue
curve).
Figure 3: Profit of U according the negotiated contract form (linear tariff or two-part-tariff)
Figure 3 indicates that under negotiations linear contracts result in lower profits than non-
linear (exclusive or non-exclusive) ones.
Points (i) and (ii), taken together, imply that, unless somehow restricted in its choices, firm U
always wants to implement selling mechanisms based on two-part tariffs.
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